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SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND ITS PLACE
IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA
ABSTRACT
The Fifteenth Amendment purported to withdraw race and color from the
calculus of suffrage. Instead, it gave rise to an era of creative exclusion in
which Southern states erected one barrier after another and Congress
floundered in its attempts to secure the black vote it had promised. After
ninety-five years, progress at last seemed possible with the introduction of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), an echo of the Fifteenth Amendment fitted
with shiny, new teeth. Section 5 of the VRA reversed the inertia of
discrimination by requiring states with a demonstrated history of employing
disfranchising voting practices to obtain federal preclearance before
implementing any changes to their voting laws.
The VRA has achieved tremendous success since its enactment, due in
large part to the powers embedded in section 5. That provision, however, was
a temporary measure, designed to remain in place only as long as it was
needed. In light of modern developments in black suffrage and political
representation, and with the election of President Obama symbolizing to many
a post-racial America, increasingly more scholars and politicians argue that
section 5 has run its course. This Comment disagrees and suggests that section
5’s language and legislative history confirm it was intended to secure not only
access to the vote for black Americans but also access to a meaningful vote for
all minorities. In this respect, section 5 still has a significant role to play for
the country’s growing numbers of nonblack minorities and naturalized
citizens.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he freedmen were not really free in 1865, nor are most of their
descendants really free in 1965. Slavery was but one aspect of a race
and color problem that is still far from solution here, or anywhere. In
America particularly, the grapes of wrath have not yet yielded all
their bitter vintage.
—Samuel Eliot Morison

1

Nearly a century after its ratification, the Fifteenth Amendment faced
continued resistance from Southern states.2 Poll taxes, literacy tests, and
similar devices dotted the Southern political landscape well into the twentieth
century, discouraging and, in some cases, precluding black voter registration
and participation.3 Congress reacted to this crisis by enacting the Voting Rights
Act of 19654 (VRA). In addition to the VRA’s general prohibition on
disfranchising practices based on race or color,5 section 4 of the Act provided a
formula to identify the major players in the persisting antisuffrage movement,6
and section 5 suspended those states’ autonomy in the election law realm.7 A
temporary provision subject to periodic renewal, section 5 required covered
states to obtain federal preclearance for all proposed changes to voting laws.8
Against the backdrop of Obama’s presidency and undeniable improvements
in black voters’ political status, many contemporary scholars and politicians
argue that section 5 has run its course.9 Their narrow construction of the
VRA’s purpose, however, fails to consider the needs of nonblack minorities,
whose already-tenuous political standing is further threatened by nativist and

1

SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 524 (1965).
Abigail Thernstrom, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: By Now, a Murky Mess, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 41, 46–47 (2007) (suggesting that, by 1965, a number of Southern states had amassed “egregious
histories of intentional Fifteenth Amendment violations”).
3 See REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1959, at 27–68 (1959) [hereinafter
CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT]. Among the factors identified as hindrances to black enfranchisement were “complex
voter-qualification laws, including tests of literacy, education, and ‘interpretation,’ . . . used arbitrarily to deny
the right to vote to citizens of the United States.” Id. at 143.
4 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (2006)).
5 See id. § 2 (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color.”).
6 Id. § 4.
7 See id. § 5.
8 See id.
9 See discussion infra Part I.C.
2
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partisan policy making.10 This Comment will demonstrate the significant role
section 5 still has to play for those growing minority populations and propose
modifications to the VRA that would better enable section 5 to identify and
address modern forms of disfranchisement.
Part I of this Comment will trace the evolution of section 5, including a
summary of its statutory and legislative history, judicial interpretations, and
modern criticisms of its continued application. Part II will highlight the
changing makeup of America’s minority and immigrant populations and
illustrate the types of discrimination they face today. Finally, Part III will
suggest modifying three provisions of the VRA to reorient section 5 toward
these new sources of disfranchisement.
I. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
In 1959, the United States Commission on Civil Rights estimated that only
25% of eligible black southerners were registered to vote, as compared to 60%
of the eligible white population.11 Far from oblivious to the problem, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Acts of 1957,12 1960,13 and 1964,14 which authorized
the Attorney General to prosecute cases of disfranchisement unilaterally.15
Rather than fortify the civil rights cause as intended, however, the acts gave
rise to a cat-and-mouse game in which states could circumvent policy-specific
injunctions by adopting endless variations on the same disfranchising
practices.16 Because cessation of those variations would require new trials, this
back-and-forth became a vicious cycle.17 As a result, aside from protests and
marches to demonstrate their growing frustrations, black southerners were

10

See discussion infra Part II.B–D.
CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 3, at 40–41.
12 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
13 Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1974–1974e (2006)).
14 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c).
16 See RICHARD LAYMAN, AMERICAN DECADES 1960–1969, at 291 (1995) (“Preparation for a trial often
required thousands of man-hours to comb voter registration records. In addition, even when the cases were
carried to conclusion and the state lost, that did not necessarily solve the problem. Some states just resorted to
new tests or different methods of racial discrimination not covered by the court decree, which was limited to
the facts of the case before it.”).
17 See id.
11
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forced to rely on inefficient—and ultimately ineffective—case-by-case
challenges to these legal obstacles.18
In March 1965, civil rights workers gathered in Selma, Alabama, to rally in
favor of stricter federal voting laws.19 Their efforts were met with extreme
violence20 in a display that attracted national attention and became a catalyst
for reform.21 Quickly, President Johnson initiated hearings on the bill that
would become the Voting Rights Act of 1965.22
The VRA provided a federal framework for addressing and, in certain
covered jurisdictions, preventing the disfranchisement of minorities.23 Most
instrumental in establishing and attaining these goals were sections 2, 4, and 5.
Section 2 laid the foundation for the VRA, echoing the language of the
Fifteenth Amendment in prohibiting the use of any “qualification or
prerequisite . . . to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color.”24 Elaborating on section 2’s “qualification
or prerequisite” language, section 4 prohibited the use of any “test or device”
to deny a United States citizen the right to vote.25 Section 4 also prescribed a
two-part formula to determine which states would be subject to section 5 of the
VRA. Covered jurisdictions were those in which (1) the Attorney General
determined a test or device had been used to disfranchise certain voters as of
November 1, 1964, and (2) less than 50% of the voting-age population had
been registered or had participated in the 1964 presidential election.26

18 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313–15, 328 (1966) (finding the civil rights acts
“ineffective” and the case-by-case litigation “inadequate” due to the “onerous” nature of trial preparation, local
officials’ tendency to defy court orders, and states’ “merely switch[ing] to discriminatory devices not covered
by the federal decrees”); LAYMAN, supra note 16, at 291.
19 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum
Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411, 1411 (1995).
20 See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
OF 1965, at 75–76 (1978); Krotoszynski, supra note 19, at 1417 (“Using tactics ‘similar to those recommended
for use by the United States Army to quell armed rioters in occupied countries,’ the state troopers attacked the
marchers with clubs, tear gas, nausea gas, and canisters of smoke.”).
21 See Krotoszynski, supra note 19, at 1412 (“The social significance of the Selma march is well
documented. By focusing national attention on the disenfranchisement of Southern blacks, it prompted
Congress to pass one of the most sweeping civil rights laws in history: the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”
(footnote omitted)).
22 See GARROW, supra note 20, at 93–94.
23 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (2006)).
24 Id. § 2.
25 See id. § 4.
26 See id. Congress had certain states in mind when drafting section 4 and worked backward to devise a
coverage formula that would implicate specifically “Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
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Section 5 of the VRA provided the Act’s teeth and is the subject of this
Comment. A temporary provision originally set to expire in 1970,27 section 5
introduced a federal preclearance requirement28—a relatively aggressive
alternative to the case-by-case challenges of the civil rights acts.29 Under this
section, jurisdictions covered by the section 4 formula were required to obtain
either administrative preclearance from the Attorney General or judicial
preclearance from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
before implementing “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in
force or effect on November 1, 1964.”30 Preclearance required a determination
that the proposed change did not have the purpose or effect of “denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”31 In effect, section 5
froze voting procedures in covered states as of November 1, 1964; more
significantly, it shifted the Attorney General’s burden under the civil rights
acts—to identify and challenge each disfranchising practice—to covered states,
which then had to obtain approval before changing any voting-related
procedures.
Although section 5 serves much the same function today as it did in 1965,
it has undergone a substantial process of refinement through legislative
amendments and judicial interpretation. The following sections of this Part will
trace section 5’s legislative and judicial history from its original enactment
through its most recent renewal in 2006. The final section will address
scholarly opposition to section 5’s continued application in what is perceived
as post-racial America.

Carolina, Virginia, and most counties in North Carolina.” See Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 49. For a discussion
of amendments to section 4’s coverage formula, see infra Part I.A.
27 See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY
19 (1992).
28 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5.
29 See LAYMAN, supra note 16, at 291.
30 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5. Section 4 did provide states with a bailout provision, under which
states covered by the formula could avoid the preclearance requirements if they could prove that no “test or
device ha[d] been used during the five years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” See id. § 4(a).
31 Id. § 5.
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A. The VRA’s Legislative History
Perhaps unsurprisingly, covered states were slow to adhere to the VRA’s
preclearance requirements.32 In fact, five of the seven states originally covered
by the VRA brought legal challenges against it.33 As a result—and over the
Nixon Administration’s objections34—Congress renewed and expanded section
5 in 1970 for an additional five years.35 Added provisions included an updated
coverage formula, with November 1968 as the new date from which to
examine minority election registration and participation,36 heightened bailout
requirements,37 a five-year renewal of section 4’s ban on the use of literacy
tests,38 and a prohibition against states imposing residency requirements
beyond thirty days for federal elections.39
Congress renewed section 5 again in 1975, this time for a period of seven
years.40 While the 1970 renewals were passed somewhat reluctantly,41 both
political parties generally supported the 1975 renewals, in part because of
increased attention from civil rights groups.42 The 1975 amendments
evidenced the first consideration of language-minority groups like AsianAmericans and Native Americans,43 and significant lobbying by Chicano and
Hispanic populations.44 These groups were found to have been “excluded from
participating in the electoral process.”45 Accordingly, Congress used the 1975
amendments to expand protection to language minorities (despite initial
32

See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT . . . THE FIRST MONTHS 23–39 (1965).
See id. at 25.
34 LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, A VOTING RIGHTS ODYSSEY: BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT IN GEORGIA 132
(2003) (“The Nixon administration advocated the outright repeal of Section 5 in 1970 . . . .”).
35 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-2 (2006)).
36 See id. sec. 4.
37 See id.; see also supra note 30 for a discussion of the previous bailout requirements.
38 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 sec. 3. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the 1970 amendments’ literacy-test ban in Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (plurality opinion).
The 1970 amendments also lowered the voting age to eighteen for all elections. See Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 sec. 6, § 301. The Supreme Court held that lowering the voting age was beyond the
scope of Congress’s power as it related to state and local elections. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 134–35 (plurality
opinion).
39 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 sec. 6, § 202.
40 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-5).
41 GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 19.
42 See id. at 20.
43 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975 sec. 301, § 203.
44 See id.
45 Id.
33

TOLEDANO GALLEYSFINAL2

396

4/3/2012 12:05 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:389

opposition from some black civil rights groups who feared dilution of the
VRA’s purpose).46 A new provision broadened the definition of “test or
device” to include the use of English-only election materials in jurisdictions
where at least 5% of the population belonged to a single language minority.47
Thus, ten years after its original implementation, section 5 was not only upheld
but was in fact expanded in response to the nation’s changing racial and ethnic
makeup. The 1975 amendments made clear that the VRA was intended to
correct more than the immediate injustices of the Jim Crow South.48
Section 5’s 1982 and 2006 renewals were subject to considerable resistance
from southerners and conservatives who felt that the paternalistic provision
had served its purpose.49 Indeed, the VRA had exceeded expectations in its
first sixteen years. Just two years after its passage, progress was undeniable50:
black registration rates in Alabama had risen from 19% to 52%, while rates in
Mississippi had jumped from 7% to 60%;51 white voters’ advantage over black
voters—estimated at almost four to one in 1964—had shrunk by more than
half;52 and in the states originally covered by section 4, among which not one
of the eighty-nine majority-black counties had a majority-black electorate prior
to 1965, nearly 40% of majority-black counties had reached majority-black
electorates by 1967 or 1968.53 By 1990, 59% of eligible black Americans were
registered to vote (as compared to 64% of eligible white Americans), and
Virginia had elected the nation’s first black governor.54 Despite these advances

46

GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 20.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975 sec. 301, § 203 (internal quotation marks omitted). Covered
language-minority groups were “persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of
Spanish heritage.” Id. sec. 403, § 207. This provision extended VRA coverage to all of Arizona, Alaska, and
Texas, and to parts of Colorado, South Dakota, California, North Carolina, and Florida. GROFMAN ET AL.,
supra note 41, at 21.
48 In the wake of Oregon v. Mitchell’s upholding the constitutionality of prohibiting literacy tests,
Congress also made the ban on literacy tests permanent. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975 § 102.
49 See ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS 105–15 (1987) (discussing political resistance to the 1982 VRA renewal); James Thomas Tucker, The
Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205 (2007)
(discussing political resistance to the 2006 VRA renewal).
50 See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter Registration in the
South, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 351,
351 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (“Most observers agree that [the VRA’s] purpose
was accomplished within a remarkably short period.”).
51 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in COLORBLIND INJUSTICE:
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 12, 55 (1999).
52 Alt, supra note 50, at 366.
53 Id. at 368.
54 KOUSSER, supra note 51, at 13.
47
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in black suffrage, however, Congress found sufficient evidence among
minorities generally to warrant continued commitment to section 5 and
renewed it for twenty-five years in both 198255 and 2006.56
B. The VRA’s Judicial History
Congressional amendments and renewals significantly reshaped the VRA,
but they constitute only one face of its evolution. A concurrent process of
refinement carried the VRA forward not from the nation’s capitol but from its
courthouses. Almost immediately following the VRA’s passage in 1965, the
Supreme Court was called upon to determine the Act’s constitutionality. In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court upheld the VRA’s coverage formula,
prohibition on literacy tests, and preclearance requirements as valid exercises
of Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.57 With the VRA’s
legitimacy established, questions arose in the subsequent decades about section
5’s scope, the precise meaning of discriminatory “purpose” and “effect,” what
was encompassed in the promise to a “right to vote,” and the level of scrutiny
to be applied to judicial preclearance determinations. The following sections
discuss each of these issues in turn.
1. Scope of Section 5
The Supreme Court first considered the scope of section 5 in its 1969
decision, Allen v. State Board of Elections.58 The case consolidated four cases
arising from various statutory amendments in Mississippi and Virginia, both of
which were subject to section 5.59 Without first obtaining preclearance, the
jurisdictions in question adopted regulations (1) enforcing at-large voting for
certain positions previously elected by district, (2) eliminating the elective
nature of other positions in favor of appointment, (3) altering candidacy
55 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 2(b), 96 Stat. 131, 133 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)). The 1982 Amendments revised the bailout provision, requiring
interested states to have had a ten-year period free of the use of tests or devices “for the purpose or with the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” and to present evidence of their
having undertaken “constructive efforts” to encourage minority voting. See id. sec. 2(b)(4).
56 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, secs. 2, 5, 7, 120 Stat. 577, 577, 580–81 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, 1973c, 1973aa-1a(b)(1)) [hereinafter Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006]; see also
infra text accompanying notes 161–66 (providing examples of modern discrimination from Congress’s 2006
reauthorization record).
57 383 U.S. 301, 308, 329–35 (1966).
58 393 U.S. 544, 550 (1969).
59 Id. at 547, 550.
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requirements for independent candidates, and (4) amending a portion of the
state code that authorized voters to handwrite the names of write-in candidates
on ballots.60 All complaints were dismissed at the trial court level because the
courts determined that the relevant statutes did not fall within the purview of
section 4 or section 5,61 which pertain to changes “with respect to voting.”62
Reversing the district courts’ decisions, the Supreme Court rejected a narrow
reading of section 5 that would limit its application to changes prescribing who
may register to vote.63 Favoring instead a broad reach for the preclearance
requirements, the Court held that section 5 was intended to target “the subtle,
as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying
citizens their right to vote because of their race.”64
In 1992, the Supreme Court more clearly defined section 5’s scope in
Presley v. Etowah County Commission.65 In that case, the Court limited the
preclearance requirement to proposed changes that fall into one of four
categories: (1) changes in “the manner of voting,” (2) changes in “candidacy
requirements and qualifications,” (3) changes “in the composition of the
electorate that may vote for candidates for a given office,” and (4) “the
creation or abolition of an elected office.”66 By refining the scope of section 5
in this way, the Court was able to provide a more concrete framework for
future decisions without compromising the intended breadth of the VRA.

60 Id. at 550–52. The voting changes implemented by Virginia and Mississippi were representative of the
newer, subtler forms discrimination took in the years after the VRA.
61 See Bunton v. Patterson, 281 F. Supp. 918, 918 (S.D. Miss. 1967) (holding that the Mississippi
measure did not fall under section 5), rev’d sub nom. Allen, 393 U.S. 544; Fairley v. Patterson, 282 F. Supp.
164, 165 (S.D. Miss. 1967) (holding that the Mississippi measure did not fall under section 5), rev’d sub nom.
Allen, 393 U.S. 544; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F. Supp. 218, 221 (E.D. Va. 1967) (holding that the
Virginia measure did not fall under section 4), vacated, 393 U.S. 544.
62 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)).
63 Allen, 393 U.S. at 564–65.
64 Id. at 565.
65 502 U.S. 491, 500–03 (1992). When two Alabama counties passed similar resolutions redistributing
power among the elected members of their county commission, three black commissioners filed suit against
the counties alleging various constitutional and statutory violations. Id. at 493–500. One of the allegations
faulted the counties for failing to obtain preclearance for the changes, despite being subject to the requirements
of section 5. Id. at 500. While upholding the generally broad scope of section 5 established in Allen, the
Presley Court ultimately held that the link between power shifts among elected officials and voting was too
attenuated to fall within the scope of section 5 prohibitions. Id. at 510.
66 Id. at 502–03.
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2. “Retrogression” and the Precise Meaning of Discriminatory “Purpose”
and “Effect”
With the scope of section 5 addressed by Allen and its progeny, courts were
still left to grapple with the question of whether a voting change had the
“purpose” or “effect” of “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color.”67 Were purpose and effect interchangeable terms?68 Would any
evidence of discrimination invalidate a proposed change?
In 1975, the Supreme Court articulated in Beer v. United States a standard
of review for preclearance under section 5’s effect prong.69 It asserted that
section 5’s purpose was to “insure that no voting-procedure changes would be
made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”70 In other words, a
procedural change’s discriminatory effects do not preclude its preclearance as
long as the proposed change would not leave minorities worse off in their
ability to exercise their right to vote than they were prior to its
implementation.71
In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, the Court applied the retrogression
test also to section 5’s purpose prong, limiting the provision’s prohibition on
discriminatory purpose to a prohibition on retrogressive purpose.72 This
decision relegated causes of action arising from discriminatory but
nonretrogressive purpose from section 5 to the more general and permanent
section 2 of the VRA.73 The Court’s decision was problematic for two reasons.
First, it suggested that a discriminatory purpose can be readily distinguished
67

See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
See Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 53 (suggesting “purpose” and “effect” were nearly interchangeable
terms because discriminatory effect was simply seen as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory purpose at a
time that the South had not yet risen above suspicion).
69 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). Following the rejection of a New Orleans redistricting plan by the Attorney
General, the city sought a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Id. at 134–36. The district court likewise rejected the proposed changes because the new plan was
unlikely to yield an election of minority officials proportional to the minority voting population. See id. at
136–37. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case back to the
district court, finding that the proposed redistricting would improve minority representation with respect to
current levels, despite falling short of statistical representation. See id. at 141–43.
70 Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
71 For an example of acceptance of this interpretation, see Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 564 (Cal. 1992)
(in bank).
72 See 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, supra
note 56. Prior to this decision, retrogression had only been tied to section 5’s effects prong. See id. at 328–29.
73 Id. at 334–36. For a comparison of section 5 with section 2, see infra text accompanying notes 260–64.
68
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from a retrogressive purpose; this is improbable. Second, by excluding
instances of purposeful discrimination from analysis under section 5 in favor of
section 2, Bossier withdrew the preclearance shield from victims of
discrimination who instead had to rely on litigation for protection. In response,
the 2006 amendments to the VRA added a definition of “purpose” that reads
“any discriminatory purpose,” presumably restoring the pre-Bossier
interpretation of section 5.74 Thus, Congress demonstrated again its continued
commitment to a strong section 5 over forty years after its conception.
3. The Right to Vote Encompasses More than Access
As the presumption of Southern racism weakened with time, Congress
shifted its emphasis from discriminatory purpose—previously a foregone
conclusion—to discriminatory effect.75 One could assume that the inherent
difficulties in divining true legislative purpose practically demanded such an
inquiry, particularly when facially neutral policies were especially conducive
to pretextual defense. Paralleling their sidestepping maneuvers under the civil
rights acts,76 Southern states quickly adapted to section 5 by adopting more
subtle means of disfranchisement, replacing tell-tale comprehension tests and
poll taxes with at-large voting77 and redistricting.78 Accordingly, the salient
determination changed from whether minorities could vote to ascertaining
whether their votes would count. This shift is best illustrated by the 2003 case
Georgia v. Ashcroft.79
An unusual case by section 5’s standards, Ashcroft involved a regulation
designed to strengthen the black vote.80 Following the 2000 census, Georgia
74

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, supra note 56, sec. 5.
See infra text accompanying notes 313–19.
76 See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
77 At-large voting refers to a system in which candidates run in more general elections, often citywide or
statewide, rather than by district. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550 (1969). Despite
arguable advantages, at-large voting tends to diminish the probability of election for minority candidates who
go from running solely in minority-populated districts to running alongside white candidates for votes from all
districts. See id. at 569. In Allen, the Court addressed Mississippi and Virginia laws that replaced district
voting with at-large voting and relegated some previously elected positions to appointed positions. Id. at 569–
70.
78 See J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 27, 31–32 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (“[I]t is improbable to expect a return to
the days when widespread violence, intimidation, or fraud, literacy tests, or poll taxes could be reimposed to
deny black voting rights altogether. Nevertheless, more sophisticated means of abridging black political power
are presently in use . . . .”).
79 539 U.S. 461 (2003), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, supra note 56.
80 Id. at 469–70.
75
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submitted a redistricting plan for preclearance, pursuant to section 5.81 The
proposed plan “unpacked” jurisdictions in which black voters were the clear
majority.82 In essence, the excess black population (i.e., the percentage of the
population that was unnecessary to secure a black majority) was siphoned off
into surrounding jurisdictions to create “influence districts” in which black
voters were not a majority, but represented a sufficiently large percentage of
the population to affect an election’s outcome.83 Of some significance is that
most black Georgians voted Democratic, that all black members elected to the
General Assembly were Democrats, and that the proposal had been
unanimously opposed by Georgian Republicans.84
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected
preclearance because the plan diluted minorities’ votes in unpacked
jurisdictions.85 The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case for further
consideration after positioning the “comparative ability of a minority group to
elect a candidate of its choice” as only one nondispositive element of the
retrogression analysis.86 Like Bossier, however, Ashcroft was overturned by
the 2006 amendments, which added a provision explicitly protecting minority
voters’ ability to “elect their preferred candidates of choice.”87 This language
clearly embraces an interpretation of section 5 that assumes that the right to
vote implicitly encompasses the right to a vote that carries some weight.
4. Judicial Standards of Review: What Level of Scrutiny Applies to
Preclearance Decisions?
While Congress and the Supreme Court played a give-and-take game to
advance their respective analyses under the VRA, case law regarding broader,
constitutional aspects of voting rights continued to develop. It had long been
established that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our
constitutional structure.”88 Thus, the question remained: If voting constituted a
fundamental right, would all procedures that burdened the right to vote be

81

Id. at 469, 471–72.
Id. at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83 Id. at 470–71.
84 See id. at 469, 471.
85 Id. at 474.
86 Id. at 482, 490. The district court must also consider “the extent to which a new plan changes the
minority group’s opportunity to participate in the political process.” Id. at 482.
87 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, supra note 56, sec. 5.
88 Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
82
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subject to strict scrutiny?89 Because most cases brought under section 5 also
involve constitutional challenges to the procedures at issue, the standard of
review established by the Supreme Court is important for both analyses.
In Burdick v. Takushi, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether a prohibition on write-in voting constituted an impermissible burden
on the right to vote.90 Although it acknowledged the fundamentality of voting
rights and protections under the Constitution, the Court declined to subject all
voting regulations to strict scrutiny.91 It adopted instead a balancing test in
which courts weigh the severity of the burden on citizens’ First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights against the state’s interests and the extent to which those
interests necessitate a burden on the right to vote.92 To be found
constitutionally valid, “severe” restrictions on the right to vote must advance a
“compelling” state interest through narrowly tailored means.93 “[R]easonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions,” on the other hand, need only advance an
“important” state interest to pass constitutional muster.94 The Burdick test, or
some variation, has been applied to a number of voting regulations,95 of which
the most relevant to this Comment are challenges to photo-identification
requirements.96

89

The different levels of judicial scrutiny were laid out in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). Constitutional law precedent mandates that courts approach state infringements
upon individual liberties that are deemed “fundamental” with “strict scrutiny.” See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam). In other words, to survive a challenge, states must demonstrate
a sufficiently compelling interest to justify such a violation of individuals’ fundamental rights. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973).
90 504 U.S. 428, 430–32 (1992). The Court ultimately held that the burden presented to Hawaiians was a
reasonable one and, therefore, constitutional. Id. at 441.
91 See id. at 433.
92 See id. at 434. This more “flexible standard” combined those of two Supreme Court cases: Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992), which implemented a “compelling” state interest standard, and Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983), which implemented an “important” state interest standard. See Burdick,
504 U.S. at 434.
93 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94 Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 See, e.g., Price v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101, 108–09 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying Burdick
to a suit challenging a state law prohibiting the use of absentee ballots in county elections); Wood v. Meadows,
207 F.3d 708, 714–15 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying Burdick to a suit challenging a state’s filing requirements for
independent candidates).
96 See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
burden imposed by a photo-identification requirement is “slight,” requiring only legitimate state interests to
survive a constitutional challenge).
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In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, an Indiana statute mandated
that voters present government-issued photo identification to vote in person.97
Petitioners, groups associated with the Democratic Party and other civil rights
organizations, challenged the statute as being in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the VRA.98 Because those burdened by the statute were
believed to be primarily Democrats (in the form of elderly, poor, disabled, and
minority voters whose limited mobility and purchasing power would impede
their ability to obtain photo identification), petitioners anticipated
disproportionate obstacles to the election of Democratic candidates.99
Applying an equivalent of the Burdick test,100 the Supreme Court
considered the weight of the state’s interests in modernizing election
procedures, preventing voter fraud, and “safeguarding public confidence” in
elections.101 The modernization of election procedures was largely fueled by
the passage of two federal statutes,102 the National Voter Registration Act of
1993103 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002104 (HAVA). The
court concluded that prevention of in-person voter fraud constituted a
legitimate interest, despite an absence of such fraud in Indiana’s history.105
Finally, the state’s interest in protecting public confidence in elections also
passed muster because of the assumed relationship between the public’s
perception of the voting process and its likelihood to participate therein.106
Accordingly, the statute was upheld.107

97 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008) (plurality opinion). The statute was supported unanimously by Republicans
and opposed unanimously by Democrats. Id. at 203.
98 See id. at 187.
99 See id. at 186–88.
100 See id. at 189–91 (drawing upon the standards laid out in Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992),
and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
101 Id. at 191.
102 See id. at 192.
103 Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–1973gg-10 (2006)). The NVRA
makes a driver’s license application serve as a voter-registration application and imposes certain restrictions on
states removing names from registered voter lists. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-3(a), 1973gg-6(d).
104 Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). HAVA requires
states to develop and maintain a computerized list of registered voters, 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1)(A), and to
verify voter identities with either a driver’s license number or the last four digits of a Social Security number,
id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i).
105 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194, 196 (plurality opinion).
106 See id. at 197.
107 Id. at 204. The Court also found the burden on voters relatively insignificant, due in large part to the
following mitigating factors built into the statute: issuance of qualifying identification cards was free of cost,
no photo identification was required to register to vote, and eligible voters who faced difficulties in obtaining
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C. The Voices of Dissension: Thernstrom and Issacharoff
Despite the language of the VRA, which protects all citizens’ right to vote
against infringement “on account of race or color,”108 section 5’s purpose is
often narrowly construed as securing the black vote.109 With that goal
essentially accomplished, and with President Obama’s rise to office as a
symbol for progress,110 scholars like Abigail Thernstrom and Samuel
Issacharoff argue section 5 has no place in a perceived “post-racial”
America.111 “[R]epeatedly attacked as antisouthern, as an infringement on
matters better left to state and local governments, [and] as unconstitutionally
color-conscious,”112 the VRA has always had its conservative critics.113
Increasingly, however, scholars from both ends of the political spectrum (like
Thernstrom and Issacharoff) have suggested that section 5 has simply run its
course. This section will outline the divergent analyses each scholar engages in
to arrive at the shared conclusion that section 5’s continued application is both
unnecessary and inappropriate.
Initially a proponent of section 5, Thernstrom now raises the criticism that,
after forty-five years of congressional and judicial give-and-take, it has been
reduced from an initial “flawless[ness]” to a “murky mess.”114 Rather than
regard the statute’s evolution as an ongoing customization to the nation’s
changing needs, she views its amendments—both statutory and judicial—as
inappropriate departures from its original scheme.115 Accordingly, Thernstrom
has followed section 5’s development disapprovingly as Congress has renewed
and expanded the statute at each term.116 She characterized the 2006
amendments, for example, as having been “rammed through with a minimum
their birth certificates could cast a provisional ballot on election day and execute an affidavit at the circuit
court clerk’s office. Id. at 186, 199.
108 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973).
109 See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 49, at 3–4. Although Thernstrom does not oppose using the VRA
to secure the Hispanic vote, she argues a more appropriate remedy would have been to ensure the provision of
bilingual ballots, rather than to expand the preclearance regime to include protection of language minorities.
Id. at 59.
110 See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
111 See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1730–31 (2004); Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 48.
112 See KOUSSER, supra note 51, at 12.
113 See THERNSTROM, supra note 49, at 105–15 (discussing political resistance to the 1982 VRA renewal
by conservative Senators Strom Thurmond and Orrin Hatch).
114 Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 41, 46.
115 See id. at 45–46.
116 See id. at 46–48.
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of debate” by a “pessimis[tic]” Congress against the backdrop of a
“transformed racial landscape.”117
While Thernstrom’s opposition to section 5 has long been shared by fellow
conservatives, even liberal commentators like Issacharoff have found common
ground against the provision in recent years. In a 2004 article, he suggested
that, “[i]n light of the tremendous political gains for minorities covered by
section 5, particularly Southern blacks, it may be perverse to even question the
need to extend section 5 after its current sunset in 2007.”118 Issacharoff’s
article, written at the close of the 1982 renewal term, explores the
circumstances surrounding the original enactment of section 5 to arrive at the
conclusion that the statute has “served its purposes.”119 Issacharoff
characterizes the South of 1965 as a region in which “the exclusion of black
Americans from meaningful political participation” awakened a sense of
“national urgency.”120 Not only were black citizens largely denied the ability to
vote, but also once suffrage was secured, the one-party South of the 1960s
provided black voters no avenue for political representation.121 This
environment, in his opinion, painted federal legislative action as the “noble”
and “enlightened” savior for Southern political decision making.122 Today, in
contrast, he argues that “the Southern political process is highly attuned to
black political claims,” severely weakening the “presumption that Washington
represents the only forum for safeguarding black political advancement.”123
Like that of Issacharoff, Thernstrom’s perspective is based on evidence of
considerable progress since the VRA’s passage.124 Both scholars argue that the
specific conditions giving rise to section 5 are no longer present to justify its
continued existence. In Thernstrom’s view, those conditions “rest[ed] on a
racism-everywhere vision, particularly, but not exclusively, in the South.”125
117

Id. at 47–48.
Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1712.
119 Id. at 1731.
120 Id. at 1710.
121 Id. at 1713 (“So long as the Democratic Party remained unchallenged, . . . the political system would
remain immune to the pressing claims of black citizens.”).
122 Id. at 1714. This perception comprises one of four factors Issacharoff identifies as crucial to section 5’s
initial success: (1) “the urgency and extent of the harm to which Congress addressed itself,” (2) the statute’s
“ease of administration,” (3) “the absence of political competition in the one-party covered jurisdictions,” and
(4) “the lack of any incentive toward partisan manipulation of the preclearance powers exercised by the
Department of Justice.” Id. at 1710, 1712–13.
123 Id. at 1714.
124 Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 44–46.
125 Id. at 42.
118
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Accordingly, Thernstrom avidly supported the original VRA, but struggles
with Congress’s and the Court’s treatment of it in the decades since.126
Specifically, she takes issue with Congress’s post-Ashcroft assertion that the
right to vote implicitly promises not only access to the ballot but also the
ability to elect a voter’s “preferred candidates of choice.”127 Thernstrom draws
the line at this notion, arguing that section 5 has now been stretched too far
beyond its intended purpose.128
With the need for section 5 arguably waning, Thernstrom and Issacharoff
also revive questions of federalism.129 As evidenced by noncovered states’
freedom to adopt and adjust voting procedures at will, such regulations are an
area traditionally reserved to the states.130 Section 5’s preclearance requirement
is, therefore, a federal intrusion on covered states’ rights—a textbook
separation-of-powers issue. Though always present in relation to the statute,
such issues were placed on the back burner by South Carolina v. Katzenbach’s
upholding of the constitutionality of section 5.131 In that case, the Supreme
Court emphasized that federalism does not shield the states’ infringement on
individuals’ constitutionally protected voting rights from federal
intervention.132 Therefore, section 5 fell within Congress’s responsibility to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.133
Thernstrom and Issacharoff suggest that the emergency conditions
surrounding the original VRA’s passage legitimized such an extreme
usurpation of covered states’ rights at the time.134 In their opinions, however, if
that emergency has subsided, then the question of section 5’s constitutionality
ought to be revisited and yield different results.135 Both scholars premise this
argument on City of Boerne v. Flores,136 in which the Court invalidated the

126

Id.
See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, supra note 56, sec. 5; THERNSTROM, supra note 49, at 4.
128 See THERNSTROM, supra note 49, at 4.
129 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1714; Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 42.
130 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”).
131 See 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966).
132 See id. at 325. “When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated
from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument
for circumventing a federally protected right.” Id. (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
133 See id. at 324–27.
134 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1719; Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 44.
135 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1719–20; Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 46.
136 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1714–15; Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 42.
127
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) as a “considerable
congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives.”137 In
exploring what constitutes an appropriate exercise of Congress’s enforcement
power, the Court returned repeatedly to the VRA. Juxtaposing the country’s
history and continued record of racial discrimination with a lack of modern
examples of laws enacted because of religious discrimination, the Court
illustrated the necessity of the VRA and the peripheral nature of RFRA.138
Today, the same case that lauded section 5 as a worthy imposition is often
quoted to signal its demise. Issacharoff and Thernstrom emphasize Boerne’s
requirement139 for “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”140 They argue that
section 5’s constitutionality teeters as it becomes a disproportionate remedy to
the injury it addresses.141
II. HAS SECTION 5 RUN ITS COURSE?
Issacharoff suggests that a lack of modern examples of racial
discrimination in the voting realm will undermine the constitutionality of
section 5.142 A thorough examination of modern election law, however, casts
doubt upon the belief that racial discrimination has been eradicated in the
voting rights arena. Perhaps the problem is that today’s discrimination would
be unrecognizable to someone still on the lookout for Jim Crow laws.143 The
metamorphosis of discrimination does not, however, signal its end. Simply put,
minorities are no longer exclusively black, and discrimination is no longer
exclusively Southern. This Part will examine the changing makeup of
America’s minorities since 1965, discuss the problems they face in today’s
society, and identify modern examples of racially discriminatory voting laws to
demonstrate the continued need for section 5.

137

521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
Id. at 530 (“RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples of modern instances of generally applicable
laws passed because of religious bigotry.”). The problem with this method of analysis is, of course, that, if
section 5 has been successful, there should be no modern examples of election laws passed because of racial
discrimination.
139 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1715; Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 42.
140 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
141 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1715; Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 42.
142 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1715.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 76–78.
138
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A. The Nonblack Minority
The country has undoubtedly seen considerable advances in black
participation in the electoral process since 1965. This does not mean, however,
that section 5 is irrelevant; a careful reading of the VRA plainly reveals that
section 5 protects not only black southerners but also minorities generally.144
Congress’s intention to bring other minority groups within the protection of
section 5 seems logical in light of the growth of such groups and is evident
from the 1975 amendments to the VRA, which added English-only ballots to
the list of prohibited tests and devices if such ballots were administered in
jurisdictions with over 5% language-minority populations.145 And while the
nation may largely have been viewed as black and white in 1965,146 today’s
census paints a different picture. The table below illustrates the U.S.
population as of 2010 broken down by race and, to some extent, ethnicity:

144 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (broadly affecting voting practices that “diminish[] the ability of any
citizen[] of the United States on account of race or color” and applying to “any discriminatory purpose”).
145 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 102, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 403
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a).
146 See Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to
1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States tbl.1 (U.S.
Census Bureau, Working Paper Series No. 56, 2002) [hereinafter Historical Census Statistics], available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/twps0056.html (follow hyperlink under
“United States—Race and Hispanic Origin: 1790 to 1990”) (showing that the 1960 Census recognized fewer
racial/ethnic categories).
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POPULATION BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN FOR THE
UNITED STATES: 2010
RACE AND
HISPANIC OR LATINO
RACE
Total population
One race
White
Black or AfricanAmerican
American-Indian and
Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian and
Other Pacific Islander
Some other race
Two or more races
HISPANIC OR LATINO
Total population
Hispanic or Latino
Not Hispanic or Latino

NUMBER

PERCENT OF TOTAL
POPULATION

308,745,538
299,736,465
223,553,265
38,929,319

100.0
97.1
72.4
12.6

2,932,248

0.9

14,674,252
540,013

4.8
0.2

19,107,368
9,009,073

6.2
2.9

308,745,538
50,477,594
258,267,944

100.0
16.3
83.7147

Of no small significance is the fact that the Hispanic/Latino population
surpassed the black population in terms of national composition, at 16.3% and
12.6%, respectively.148 In contrast, the 1960 Census did not even provide a
category for Hispanic/Latino self-identification.149 And while the black
population has stayed fairly constant since 1960, at which point 10.5% of the
population was black,150 the Asian population has jumped from 0.5% to
4.8%—rendering it the fastest-growing race group between 2000 and 2010.151

147 KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br02.pdf.
148 Id.
149 See Historical Census Statistics, supra note 146, tbl.1.
150 Id.
151 See id.; see also HUMES ET AL., supra note 147, at 4 tbl.1, 4–5.
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The U.S. Census Bureau noted upon publication of the 2000 Census data that
“[t]he federal government considers race and Hispanic origin to be two
separate and distinct concepts.”152 Accordingly, the 2000 Census was amended
to include a separate opportunity for citizens to self-identify as Spanish,
Hispanic, or Latino.153 If the 16.3% of citizens who identified themselves as
Hispanic or Latino in 2010 were subtracted from the white population, then
only 56.1% of the United States population would have been white as of
2010,154 as compared to 88.6% in 1960.155
B. The New Dilemma
In a decade when the country was essentially black and white (at 10.5%
and 88.6% of the population, respectively), section 5 was conceived as a means
of forcing the Fifteenth Amendment’s suffrage guarantee upon the Jim Crow
South. In contrast, as illustrated in the section above, the country’s ethnic
makeup today is comprised of more groups, with more members in each group,
shrinking the white population to only 56.1% and unseating black Americans
from the dominant minority position.156 Like their predecessors, today’s
minorities face a number of structural, political, and economic obstacles that
inhibit the exercise of their electoral rights. Accordingly, the improved
registration and participation rates among black voters attributable to the VRA
are yesterday’s successes. Modern outlets of discrimination may bear little
resemblance to those of the 1960s on the surface,157 but they further the same
hegemonic ends and equally warrant redress.
The inherent difficulties in arriving late to the scene, so to speak, place
Hispanic/Latino and Asian groups at a distinct disadvantage politically: these
groups are underrepresented both as voters and as elected officials. In the 2008
presidential election, the U.S. Census Bureau reported “significantly lower”
Asian and Hispanic voter-registration rates as compared to non-Hispanic white
and black registration rates.158 Likewise, only 60.5% of naturalized citizens
152 ELIZABETH M. GRIECO & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2000, at 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf.
153 Id. at 1–2.
154 See HUMES ET AL., supra note 147, at 4, tbl.1.
155 See Historical Census Statistics, supra note 146, tbl.1.
156 See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 77–78.
158 THOM FILE & SARAH CRISSEY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND
REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2008, at 2–5 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
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were registered to vote, while 71.8% of native-born Americans were
registered.159 As of 2004, “[b]lacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans ma[de] up
over a quarter of the national population, but . . . less than 5% of the nation’s
elected officials.”160
The record before Congress during section 5’s 2006 reauthorization period
also provided “evidence of high levels of resistance from jurisdictions with
growing minority populations.”161 For example, the white mayor and board of
aldermen in a Mississippi jurisdiction cancelled a 2001 election to prevent the
growing minority population from unseating them.162 Similarly, a Louisiana
jurisdiction proposed a redistricting plan following the 2000 Census that
wholly eliminated a majority-black district to encourage proportional
representation of whites.163 And in response to an “increasingly politically
active and cohesive” Latino community, a 2003 Texas redistricting plan
removed Latino voters from a congressional district to decrease their electoral
opportunities.164 The reauthorization record also contained evidence of
discrimination against language minorities entitled to non-English election
materials: NAACP attorney Kristen Clarke noted that, “of the 101 counties
investigated, eighty percent were unable to produce voter registration forms,
official ballots, provisional ballots, and their written voting instructions in a
manner compliant with the language minority provisions of the Voting Rights
Act.”165
Exacerbating the structural inequalities facing nonblack minorities are the
country’s reactions to recent political and economic hardship. The years since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have been characterized not only

2010pubs/p20-562.pdf (finding that 72.0% of whites, 69.7% of blacks, 55.3% of Asian-Americans, and 59.4%
of Hispanics had registered to vote).
159 Id. at 4 tbl.2.
160 Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Transforming Votes into Victories: Turnout, Institutional Context,
and Minority Representation in Local Politics, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006:
PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 83, 84 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007) (citations
omitted).
161 Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How Much
Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 385, 406 (2008).
162 See id. at 407.
163 See id. The same district had been denied preclearance for its proposals following the 1980 and 1990
Censuses as well. See DEBO P. ADEGBILE, RENEWTHEVRA.ORG, VOTING RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 1982–2006, at
14–15 (2006), available at http://www.protectcivilrights.org/pdf/voting/LouisianaVRA.pdf.
164 Clarke, supra note 161, at 408 (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,
439 (2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
165 Id. at 410–11.
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by a growing solidarity among native-born Americans but also by a growing
resentment and wariness of minority and immigrant populations. As an
illustration of this nativist backlash, the FBI noted a sharp increase in hate
crimes motivated by ethnicity and national origin in 2001—the rate of such
crimes having doubled in just one year since 2000.166 In the same year, antiIslamic incidents rose from the second least reported to the second highest
reported.167 And while Muslims are the most visible targets of the post-9/11
era, that period has also engendered antipathy to immigrants and minorities
more generally.168 To be clear, the backlash described here is not solely—or
even primarily—violent or overtly xenophobic; instead, it involves native-born
Americans drawing what some consider to be a proverbial line in the sand. As
an example, in 2006, for the first time in the country’s history, the Senate voted
to establish English as the official national language of the United States.169
The country’s reaction to 9/11 may seem isolated, but when placed in
historical context, a distinct pattern emerges. “As more foreigners, different
culturally and physically, moved to the United States, Americans feared that
the immigrants invaded their territory, threatened their jobs, and changed their
values.”170 Out of context, this passage could easily describe the last ten years
when, in fact, it refers to early-twentieth-century America and its fearful
reaction to a surge in immigration.171 The resulting political climate led to antiimmigrant legislation like the Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1918 Alien
Control Act, meant to stem the flow of undesirable immigration and to increase
governmental scrutiny of immigrants already in the country.172 Later in the
century, Japanese internment and establishment of the House Un-American
Activities Committee sprang from the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Second
Red Scare, respectively.173 These examples are, perhaps, unrelated to voting
166 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FBI, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2001, at i (2002), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2001.
167 Id. It is worth noting that, regardless of other fluctuations, the most prevalent motivation for hate
crimes has always been race. Id.
168 See generally Jamie Winders, Bringing Back the (B)order: Post-9/11 Politics of Immigration, Borders,
and Belonging in the Contemporary US South, 39 ANTIPODE 920, 920 (2007) (exploring the difficulties facing
Latino immigrants in light of the “growing nativist sentiment across the US since 9/11”).
169 See Carl Hulse, Senate Passes a Bill that Favors English, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at A18.
170 Paul Brickner & Meghan Hanson, The American Dreamers: Racial Prejudices and Discrimination As
Seen Through the History of American Immigration Law, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 203, 217 (2004).
171 Id.
172 See id. at 217–27.
173 See John Ip, Response, How Do the Abuses of Civil Liberties Under the George W. Bush
Administration Compare to the Internments of Japanese Aliens and Japanese-Americans During World War
II?, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5023 (2010) (comparing post-9/11 America to post-WWII America); G. L.
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rights, but as professor Kevin Johnson noted, they “demonstrate how the
hostility toward foreigners outside the nation influences hate for the ‘foreigner’
inside our borders.”174
Despite the strong connection between these periods of intolerance and
mass immigration or acts of war, political turmoil is not the sole trigger of
intolerance. The socioeconomic model of ethnic-competition theory suggests
that ethnic groups are constantly in competition with one another “for power,
social control, territory, economic and social incentives, or social identity.”175
Viewed through an ethnic-competition lens, American minorities and
naturalized citizens have not only the lingering effects of 9/11 to contend with
but also the economic recession. Ethnic-competition theory would suggest that,
as the country’s resources become more limited, economic motives for antiimmigrant sentiments become stronger.176 After years of alarming
unemployment rates, it is not uncommon to hear concerns that immigrants are
edging Americans out of jobs.177 With government budgets tightened, people
become more focused on the perceived strain illegal immigrants place on
public benefits.178 This environment not only tolerates but in fact nurtures
racially discriminatory and anti-immigrant legislation.
C. Modern Disfranchisement in Arizona
In 2004, Arizona enacted Proposition 200, a state law that required firsttime voters to provide proof of citizenship upon registration and all in-person
voters to provide identification at the polls.179 Acceptable proof of citizenship
Tyler, House Un-American Activities Committee, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 780
(Paul Finkelman ed., 2006).
174 Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in
the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833, 837 (1997).
Johnson referred to a somewhat different set of examples, but they illustrate much the same point. See id. In
addition, his article was published in 1997, well before 9/11, which further suggests that the post-9/11 political
climate was not only in line with this country’s history but also a predictable reaction. See id.
175 See Károly Takács, Models of Intergroup Conflict, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MIND (forthcoming
2012), available at http://unibs.academia.edu/KárolyTakács/Papers/138827/Models_of_Intergroup_Conflict.
176 See id.
177 To illustrate this point, a Google search for the words “immigrants taking” on February 12, 2011,
suggested the following ways to complete the phrase (in descending order): “immigrants taking American
jobs,” “immigrants taking jobs,” “immigrants taking jobs from Americans,” “immigrants taking our jobs,”
“immigrants taking over jobs,” and “immigrants taking jobs away from Americans.” GOOGLE, http://www.
google.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (type “immigrants taking” into the search bar).
178 See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status,
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1541 (1995).
179 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-152, 16-166, 16-579 (2006).
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included an Arizona driver’s license number, a copy of a birth certificate or
U.S. passport, and original naturalization documents or the number from a
certificate of naturalization.180 Arizona, subject to section 5, obtained
preclearance with regard to Proposition 200 from the Attorney General in
2005.181
In 2006, Native Americans and community organizations joined various
Arizona residents in Gonzalez v. Arizona, challenging Proposition 200.182 The
following year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the
plaintiffs’ challenges to Proposition 200, the most important of which were as
follows: (1) the identification requirement constituted a poll tax in violation of
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, (2) the proposition imposed a severe burden
on the fundamental right to vote, (3) the proposition imposed a
disproportionate burden on naturalized citizens, and (4) the proposition’s
proof-of-citizenship requirement was inconsistent with the NVRA.183 The
Ninth Circuit found in the defendants’ favor on each issue.184 Because it is
most intimately tied to analysis under the VRA, the plaintiffs’ third claim
warrants closer examination.185
180

Id. § 16-166(F)).
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 3 (2006) (per curiam). The effects of Justice Department partisan bias
in this and other arguably “wrongful” preclearance determinations are discussed in Part III.
182 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–6, Gonzalez v. Arizona, 2006 WL 3627297, at *3
(D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006) (Nos. CV 06-1268-PHX, CV 06-1362-PHX, CV 06-1575-PHX). Plaintiffs also
sought a preliminary injunction to suspend Proposition 200’s effects until after the election period. Id. at 24.
The preliminary injunction was denied at the district court level prior to the court issuing its findings of fact
and conclusions of law. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 3. Before those findings were made, the Ninth Circuit granted
a separate injunction on an emergency basis (due to the very imminent election period) pending appeal of the
original denial. See id. at 3. This decision was revisited by the Supreme Court and vacated. See id. at 5–6. The
Court reasoned that an appellate decision made without a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
could not have given the trial court’s discretion requisite deference. See id.
183 Gonzalez v. Arizona (Gonzalez I), 485 F.3d 1041, 1048–51 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit upheld
the proof-of-citizenship requirement as consistent with the NVRA in 2007. Id. at 1050. In a 2010 appeal from
the district court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment, however, the Ninth Circuit declared the
requirement inconsistent with the NVRA, which mandates that states “accept and use” the federal voter
registration form without additional requirements. Gonzalez v. Arizona (Gonzalez II), 624 F.3d 1162, 1183–84
(9th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted, 649 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2011).
184 Gonzalez I, 485 F.3d at 1048–51.
185 See id. at 1050. Plaintiffs’ second claim, that the proposition imposed a severe burden on the right to
vote, was rejected by the court. See id. at 1049–50. Due, in part, to Proposition 200’s facially neutral
application and, in part, to the court’s belief that most Arizona residents were in possession of at least one of
the prescribed forms of identification, the court reasoned that the burden imposed by Proposition 200 was
similar to other restrictions deemed to be “not severe.” Id. (quoting Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d
1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to survive plaintiffs’ second challenge
and justify its intrusion on voting rights, Arizona had only to advance an “important regulatory interest.” Id. at
1049 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The state’s
181
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The plaintiffs’ third claim, that Proposition 200 imposed a disproportionate
burden on naturalized citizens,186 struck closest to the heart of section 5.
Unfortunately, this issue was not resolved in Gonzalez I.187 The court declined
to comment directly on this challenge because no naturalized citizens had
submitted affidavits in support of the proposition.188 In a subsequent appeal,
Gonzalez II, the issue was rendered moot by the court invalidating Proposition
200’s proof-of-citizenship requirement as inconsistent with the NVRA.189 With
the Ninth Circuit recently granting a rehearing en banc, the issue is not quite
settled.190
Without findings regarding the burden on naturalized citizens, Gonzalez II
rested on a state’s interest in “protecting the integrity of the electoral process”
prevailing over a statute’s potentially discriminatory effects.191 As this case
stands, one would be hard-pressed to argue against an American citizen’s right
to an undiluted vote. After all, for nearly fifty years, American schoolchildren
have memorized the now-famous principle derived from Baker v. Carr, “one
person, one vote.”192 However, the VRA’s language and Issacharoff’s claim
that we lack modern examples of racially discriminatory voting laws193 require
an inquiry into more than Proposition 200’s effects; they also demand an
inquiry into its purpose.
In a case involving election law, injunctive relief may be granted with the
court’s consideration of any one of the following factors: the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success on the merits, the plaintiff’s likelihood to be irreparably
harmed by a denial of the injunction, the parties’ respective hardships, or the
injunction’s ability to serve the public interest.194 In Gonzalez I, the Ninth
Circuit found the “balance of hardships tipped sharply in favor of [the state]”
due in large part to Arizona’s having “invested enormous resources in

“indisputably . . . compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process” prevailed. Purcell, 549
U.S. at 4 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
186 Gonzalez I, 485 F.3d at 1050.
187 See id.
188 Id.
189 Gonzalez II, 624 F.3d at 1191. For a discussion of the NVRA, see supra note 103 and accompanying
text.
190 Gonzalez v. Arizona, 649 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2011).
191 Gonzalez II, 624 F.3d at 1078.
192 See 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
193 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1716–20.
194 Gonzalez I, 485 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).
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preparing to apply Proposition 200.”195 Such an expenditure of resources might
suggest that Proposition 200 was enacted to address a serious threat to
Arizona’s voters when, in fact, the state presented evidence that, in ten years, it
had identified only 232 noncitizens attempting to register to vote.196 In 2000,
Arizona’s population was estimated to be 5,130,632.197 Of course, the 232
citizens whose votes were effectively cancelled out deserve redress, but they
constituted only 0.0045% of Arizona’s population. Could there be another
purpose behind “invest[ing] enormous resources” in Proposition 200?
Perhaps the answer lies in an examination of the law in context. Proposition
200, named the “Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act,”198 was cast by
some as a reclamation of Arizona by its citizens.199 The requirement for voters’
proof of citizenship was only one piece of the legislation; additional provisions
conditioned access to public benefits on documentary proof of citizenship and
criminalized state employees’ failures to report immigration violations to
federal authorities.200 Section 2 of the Act stated, “[I]llegal immigration is
causing economic hardship to this state.”201 It further read, “[I]llegal
immigrants have been given a safe haven in this state with the aid of
identification cards that are issued without verifying immigration status, and
that . . . conduct . . . demeans the value of citizenship.”202
Despite this language, it is possible to infer that Proposition 200 was not
only aimed at illegal immigrants but also laced with anti-immigration
sentiments more generally. Proposition 200 was advanced primarily by two
groups: Protect Arizona Now (PAN) and the Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FAIR).203 PAN’s national advisor, Virginia Abernethy,

195

Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Arizona, Nos. CV 06-1268-PHX, CV 06-1362-PHX, CV 06-1575-PHX, 2006
WL 3627297, at *9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196 Id. at 1048.
197 State & County QuickFacts: Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
04000.html (last revised Jan. 16, 2012).
198 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-140.01 (2005).
199 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform, Proposition 200: Cutting Through the
Rhetoric and Getting to the Facts About the Protect Arizona Now Initiative (July 12, 2004), available at http://
www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=media_media3658.
200 See § 46-140.01.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, 2004 ELECTION ANALYSIS: ARIZONA’S PROPOSITION 200, at 1 (2004),
available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/AZProp200Analysis.pdf.
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considers herself a “white separatist”204 and advocates a “catch-our-breath
moratorium on legal immigration.”205 FAIR similarly describes itself as an
organization dedicated to “promot[ing] immigration levels consistent with the
national interest—more traditional rates of about 300,000 a year.”206
The justification for Proposition 200 as a voter-fraud-prevention measure is
unconvincing. With virtually no evidence of such fraud in Arizona’s history—
or, for that matter, in the country’s history207—the law appears to be a means
of erecting barriers between the state’s native and immigrant populations.208 In
this context, section 5 remains a necessary safeguard to ensure that legitimate
efforts to enforce immigration policy are not carried out at the expense of a
state’s minority residents and naturalized citizens.209
D. Modern Disfranchisement in Georgia
Arizona’s Proposition 200 is not an isolated illustration of modern racial
discrimination in voting laws. In 2008, Georgia’s Office of the Secretary of
State developed a citizenship-verification program210 that cross-referenced
Department of Driver Services databases against voter-registration data.211 The
aim of this program was to identify and flag registered voters whose

204 See Heidi Beirich, Racist Prof Latest to Join Group that Seeks White Rule in America, S. POVERTY L.
CENTER HATEWATCH BLOG (June 27, 2011), http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2011/06/27/racist-emeritus-proflatest-to-join-group-that-seeks-white-rule-in-america/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
205 Virginia Deane Abernethy, Census Bureau Distortions Hide Immigration Crisis: Real Numbers Much
Higher, POPULATION–ENV’T BALANCE (2006), http://www.balance.org/alerts/alert0610aa.html (emphasis
added).
206 See About FAIR, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/about/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012).
207 See Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an Inconsistent
Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009) (“There is little empirical or
systemic evidence to support the contention that voter-initiated fraud is widespread, be it ineligible voters
seeking to vote or eligible voters casting multiple ballots in several locations.”).
208 See supra text accompanying notes 196–97.
209 This Comment is not intended to cast suspicion upon legislators or to paint particular state decisions in
a negative light. Certainly, Arizona’s proximity to the Mexican border presents the state with unique
challenges not shared by the country as a whole. However, those challenges must be met with means that do
not disfranchise minority citizens.
210 See Letter from Thurbert Baker, Ga. Att’y Gen., to Christopher Coates, Voting Section Chief, Dep’t of
Justice Civil Rights Div. (Oct. 18, 2008), available at http://www.champaigncountyclerk.com/elections/docs/
Georgia/10_14_2008_Georgia_expedited_review_request.pdf.
211 See Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., to
Thurbert E. Baker, Ga. Att’y Gen. (May 29, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from Loretta King], available at http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ltr/l_052909.php.
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citizenship had not been verified between the two systems.212 Any such voters
would be notified accordingly and required to take additional steps to verify
their registration before being permitted to vote.213
A Georgia resident and various minority organizations sued the state for
administering this program prior to obtaining section 5 preclearance.214 A
district court issued a preliminary injunction in late October 2008, just in time
to suspend the program’s effects for the 2008 elections.215 The court extended
the injunction in 2010 but denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment,
in anticipation of the Justice Department’s preclearance determination.216
In fact, the Justice Department had already issued a conclusion regarding
Georgia’s citizenship-verification program. In May 2009, the Department
addressed a letter to Georgia’s attorney general objecting to preclearance for
the program.217 Georgia, the letter stated, had failed to sustain “its burden of
showing that the proposed change ‘neither has the purpose nor will have the
effect’ of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color or
membership in a language minority group.”218 The Department found not only
that the additional requirements would pose considerable obstacles to flagged
individuals but also that the system was inaccurate and overinclusive, having
wrongly flagged thousands of Georgia citizens who were, in fact, eligible to
vote.219 More significantly, of those wrongly flagged, 45.7% were naturalized
citizens.220 The Department further determined that Hispanic and Asian voters
were “more than twice as likely to appear on the list” than white voters and
that 60% more black voters were flagged than white voters, despite
comparable registration numbers.221
After reconsideration and a second denial by the Justice Department in
February 2010,222 Georgia filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District
212

See id.
See id.
214 See Morales v. Handel, No. 1:08-CV-3172 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 2008).
215 Id. at 26–27.
216 Morales v. Kemp, No. 1:08-CV-3172 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2010).
217 See Letter from Loretta King, supra note 211.
218 See id.
219 See id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., to
Dennis R. Dunn, Ga. Deputy Att’y Gen. (Feb. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas E. Perez], available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Georgia-Complaint-8-16-10e4.pdf.
213
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of Columbia to challenge the decision.223 The case was settled abruptly in
August 2010 when the Justice Department precleared the citizenshipverification program and requested that the district court dismiss the case.224
Many speculated that the Department folded to avoid Georgia challenging not
only the preclearance denial but also the constitutionality of section 5 itself.225
In the meantime, Georgia introduced Senate Bill 86 (SB 86) in 2009, a bill
cut from the same cloth as Arizona’s Proposition 200, requiring residents to
provide proof of citizenship upon registering to vote.226 Like the citizenshipverification program discussed above, SB 86 was also implemented without
having been submitted for preclearance.227 In the wake of two administrative
preclearance denials by the Justice Department over the citizenshipverification program, Georgia proceeded directly to an action for judicial
preclearance of SB 86 in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.228 That case was dismissed in 2011 when the Justice Department
granted Georgia preclearance for SB 86.229
Undoubtedly, Georgia will face further litigation over SB 86. Like
Proposition 200, SB 86 has the potential to disproportionately burden
minorities and the elderly. Furthermore, the lengthy preclearance process over
Georgia’s citizenship-verification program has brought the state’s voting
measures under intense scrutiny by minority organizations. Already, this issue
has attracted the attention of high-profile groups, like the NAACP and the
ACLU, in addition to local organizations, like the Georgia Association of
Latino Elected Officials.230
223

See Aaron Gould Sheinin, State Wins Voter ID Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 24, 2010, at A1.
Id.
225 See id.; Ewa Kochanska, Georgia Voter Citizenship Verification System Finally Approved by DOJ,
EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/political-buzz-in-atlanta/georgia-votercitizenship-verification-system-finally-approved-by-doj (“The Administration most likely decided to approve
the system because not doing so would have risked putting the whole Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in
jeopardy.”).
226 S.B. 86, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009); see also Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note
222. Because SB 86 was modeled after Proposition 200, similarities between the two measures render further
discussion of SB 86’s sociopolitical implications unnecessary.
227 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 222.
228 See Press Release, Brian P. Kemp, Ga. Sec’y of State, Secretary of State Kemp Announces Intent to
File Suit Against Obama Justice Department (Feb. 23, 2010), available at www.sos.ga.gov/pressrel/2010_
releases/February/20100223Secretary%20of%20State%20Kemp%20Announces%20Intent%20to%20File%20
Suit%20against%20Obama%20Justice%20Department.htm.
229 See Bill Rankin, Citizenship Process Approved, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 5, 2011, at B2.
230 See Morales v. Kemp, No. 1:08-CV-3172 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2010) (order extending preliminary
injunction and denying summary judgment); Sheinen, supra note 223.
224
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Despite the situation’s similarities to the Gonzalez litigation, however, it
carries the potential for a notably different outcome. At the Ninth Circuit in
Gonzalez I, the court neglected to rule on a vital challenge to Proposition
200—whether the measure disproportionately burdened naturalized citizens—
because no affidavits had been filed by naturalized citizens.231 Plaintiffs in this
case are unlikely to make the same mistake. For one, Georgia’s premature
implementation of the contested voting procedures has allowed ample time for
opponents to collect data regarding SB 86’s effects on minorities. Also,
legislation such as Arizona’s more recent immigration bill232 has likely
cultivated heightened sensitivity to such issues since Gonzalez II. Without a
firm precedent weighing in favor of such procedures against the burden they
present for naturalized citizens, Georgia may find it difficult to overcome a
comparable challenge to SB 86. And in the course of such a challenge, Georgia
would also have to defeat the Justice Department’s findings that its datacomparison system disproportionately burdens minorities and naturalized
citizens at statistically significant rates.233
The resolution of the Georgia cases will be important on a number of
levels. As section 5 case law stands, laws like Arizona’s and Georgia’s that
target immigrant and minority populations are almost sure to fail the
retrogression test. By injecting additional administrative steps in the way of
minority and immigrant voters, these laws and others like them are in direct
conflict with section 5’s effect prong. Certainly, the Justice Department’s
statistical findings and continued opposition to the citizenship-verification
program suggest the program’s discriminatory effects. Furthermore,
Proposition 200’s context and sponsorship could support a finding not only of
discriminatory effects but also of discriminatory purpose.
The Georgia and Arizona examples are not meant as exercises in whistleblowing, however. Both states had legitimate motives for their laws; certainly,
the states should be able to ensure that registered voters are citizens. Yet,
presented with such abundant evidence that the chosen measures present
unequal obstacles to minorities and naturalized citizens, it seems obvious that
the interests of those populations are not currently a legislative priority. It is in

231

485 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007).
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (requiring Arizona state and local police to determine
the citizenship status of individuals if there is a “reasonable suspicion” that they are illegal immigrants and to
arrest those individuals who do not provide adequate documentation).
233 See Letter from Loretta King, supra note 211.
232
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this capacity that section 5 has functioned and continues to function in its
intended role.
III. A NEW PROBLEM CALLS FOR A NEW SOLUTION
In 2009, the Supreme Court narrowly avoided ruling on the
constitutionality of section 5 in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder234 (NAMUDNO). The NAMUDNO district challenged a
bailout determination and, like Georgia in its case against the Justice
Department, challenged the constitutionality of section 5 in the alternative.235
Opting to determine the bailout issue on statutory grounds, the Court explicitly
reserved the question of section 5’s constitutionality for another day.236 Justice
Thomas noted in the Court’s opinion, however, that the federalism costs
associated with section 5 had caused members of the Court “to express serious
misgivings about [its constitutionality].”237
The issue narrowly avoided judicial review again in January of 2012, when
the Supreme Court heard the Texas redistricting case Perry v. Perez.238 In that
case, the Texan government had responded to the 2010 Census data by
redrawing its electoral maps in an allegedly discriminatory fashion.239
Recognizing that Texas could neither expect a preclearance decision in time
for the 2012 elections nor use its pre-census boundaries, a panel of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas devised interim plans.240 While
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the lower court had
afforded the Texan government appropriate deference in its proposal,241 many
anticipated a further decision as to the constitutionality of section 5.242 Likely
due to the highly expedited nature of the case, the Texan government opted not
to raise the contentious challenge. Still, the Court seized the opportunity to
note once again the “serious constitutional questions” surrounding section 5.243
Indeed, Justice Thomas’s brief concurrence suggested that Texas’s failure to
234

129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
See id. at 2508.
236 See id. at 2516–17.
237 Id. at 2511.
238 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam).
239 Id. at 940.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 943.
242 See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Is Section 5 on the Line Right Now?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 3, 2012, 6:33 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=135779.
243 132 S. Ct. at 942.
235
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obtain preclearance for its maps presented no obstacle because section 5 is
unconstitutional.244 Together, these cases illustrate that a decision is inevitable
and that, in all likelihood, it will approach sooner, rather than later.
A challenge to section 5 requires a hard look at the function it serves in
today’s society. Thernstrom and Issacharoff argue that section 5’s
constitutionality teeters as it becomes a disproportionate remedy to the injury it
addresses.245 To a large extent, they are correct—section 5 is no longer an
adequate remedy for the harm it was designed to address. However, the 2006
reauthorization record and the Georgia and Arizona illustrations demonstrate
that the country’s minorities and naturalized citizens could face tremendous
obstacles in section 5’s absence. The reasonable solution is thus not to abolish
section 5 but to rework the statute in light of the new problems it faces:
specifically, the changing nature of discrimination,246 the increasing
politicization of the preclearance process,247 and the lack of transparency in
Justice Department determinations.248 The following sections provide
examples of and solutions to the ways these problems manifest themselves in
section 5 preclearance determinations, bailout procedures, and coverage. The
first section will propose a private right to judicial review of preclearance
decisions and a formalized documentation process for the Justice Department
to issue opinions. The second section will propose a periodic bailout review
that provides a more active role for concerned minorities. Finally, the third
section will propose changing the standard under the VRA’s “bail-in”

244

Id. at 945 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1715; Thernstrom, supra note 2, at 42.
246 See Nathaniel Persily, Options and Strategies for Renewal of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 49
HOW. L.J. 717, 718 (2006) [hereinafter Persily, Options and Strategies] (“The old barriers to minority
empowerment, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses, are no longer with us, but different
obstacles have been erected by both Democrats and Republicans under the banner of normal partisan
politics.”); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 197
(2007) [hereinafter Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls] (“[T]urnout statistics no longer capture the level of
unconstitutional discrimination that may exist in the covered or noncovered jurisdictions.”).
247 See MARK A. POSNER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POLICY, THE POLITICIZATION OF
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DECISIONMAKING UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: IS IT A PROBLEM AND
WHAT SHOULD CONGRESS DO? 13 (2006) (“Recent revelations . . . strongly suggest that the historical pattern
[of nonpartisan preclearance determinations] has been broken and that the inherent danger of political
decisionmaking has indeed become a reality.”).
248 See Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 HOW. L.J.
785, 832 (2006) (“The major problem with the current system . . . is that the current preclearance process lacks
transparency and is subject to partisan manipulation by the political party holding the reins of DOJ.”).
245
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provision249 to afford private citizens and courts better opportunities to impose
preclearance on offending jurisdictions.
A. Updating Section 5 Preclearance
As Issacharoff and other critics note, section 5 preclearance determinations
are increasingly susceptible to partisan manipulation.250 In the VRA’s early
years, the South’s one-party political structure provided no incentive for
partisan decision making by the Justice Department.251 Issacharoff posited,
“Until the reemergence of the Republican Party in the South, intervention from
Washington could alter the racial dimensions of political power, but not the
partisan divide.”252 In contrast, preclearance determinations in today’s
bipartisan South253 can not only alter local politics but also carry nationwide
implications for a party.254 A 2002 redistricting plan from Texas illustrates
how instrumental voting changes today can be in carrying out political agendas
(at the expense of minority voters) and how susceptible the preclearance
process can be to partisan bias. The Republican-sponsored plan proposed middecade redistricting that would alter the composition of thirty-one of Texas’s
thirty-two congressional districts in the party’s favor.255 Because it
disadvantaged black and Latino voters, Justice Department staff unanimously
opposed the plan.256 Nevertheless, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, a
Bush appointee, granted preclearance over the Department’s objections.257
In some instances, partisan tensions between Washington and covered
states help section 5 serve its purpose: the Justice Department’s preclearance
249 The counterbalance to the bailout provision, the VRA’s “bail-in” provision permits courts to impose
preclearance requirements on noncovered jurisdictions that violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). “Courts” in this context refers to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia and, in the event of an appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States. See id. § 1971(g).
250 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1713–14; accord Tokaji, supra note 248, at 788 (“The enormous
power vested in the DOJ to grant or deny administrative preclearance is subject to partisan manipulation.”);
Edward Blum et al., Who’s Playing Politics?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 24, 2006, 8:29 AM), http://www.
nationalreview.com/articles/216584/whos-playing-politics/edward-blum.
251 See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 1713–14.
252 Id. at 1713.
253 The term “South” is used here as shorthand for covered states under section 5 of the VRA.
254 See Sandhya Somashekhar & Aaron Blake, Electoral Map Gets a GOP Tinge, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
2010, at A4. Locally, redistricting can affect the results for mayoral and gubernatorial elections, but it can also
determine which party will occupy a state’s congressional seats. See id. This figure, of course, corresponds
with a state’s electoral college votes in presidential elections. Id.
255 See Tokaji, supra note 248, at 809.
256 See id. at 810–11.
257 Id. at 811.
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determination and the state’s right to judicial review serve as checks on one
another. In those cases, Washington keeps covered states from advancing their
political agendas at the expense of minorities, and covered states can enlist
court oversight to ensure the Justice Department has not wrongfully denied
preclearance. The inverse scenario is more problematic. When the Justice
Department and a state share political leanings, discriminatory proposals can
be wrongfully precleared.258 In those situations, wronged minorities are
currently unable to bring an action for judicial review under section 5.259 They
may, and do, bring actions under section 2 but are disadvantaged by the burden
of proof and standard of review necessary in section 2 cases.260 Whereas
section 5 places the burden on the state to prove that its proposed measure is
not retrogressive in effect or discriminatory in purpose, section 2 places the
burden on plaintiffs to prove that a voting law has the effect of diluting
minority votes.261 Because of section 2’s reversed burden and narrower scope,
it is not an adequate substitute for section 5 review.
This Comment proposes allowing private citizens to petition for judicial
review of preclearance decisions. Rather than adopt the burden-shifting model
from section 2, the standard of review for these decisions would be
substantially identical to the judicial review of preclearance denials currently
available to states under section 5. Thus, minorities could add their own check
on the preclearance process, guarding against partisan abuse from within the
established framework of section 5.262
The benefits of using judicial review in this capacity are clear: allowing the
judiciary to oversee preclearance decisions not only provides an impartial
arbiter263 to right partisan wrongs but also encourages the Justice Department
to make more defensible decisions in the first place.264 Weighing the costs and
258

The Texas redistricting plan is a prime example of this scenario. See supra text accompanying notes
255–60.
259 See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 747 (2006) (“Preclearance grants . . . are not subject to judicial review.”).
260 See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Strategic Dominance Argument for Retaining Section 5 of
the VRA, 5 ELECTION L.J. 283, 284–85 (2006).
261 See id.
262 Another benefit of this model is that it makes the preclearance process more adept at catching the
various forms of discrimination. As the avenues for disfranchisement become more subtle and varied, they
likely become more difficult to identify on paper in a limited timeframe. Who better to identify the latent
sources of discrimination than their victims?
263 This Comment acknowledges the growing discourse positioning judges as political actors but suggests
that judges are better insulated from political prodding than their executive counterparts.
264 See POSNER, supra note 247, at 15–16; Tokaji, supra note 248, at 820–21.
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benefits of judicial review of agency action, Professor Cass Sunstein suggested
that it acts as “an ex ante deterrent and as an ex post check against the
domination of administrative processes by irrelevant or illegitimate
considerations.”265 Thus, to some extent, the availability of judicial review
might also alleviate the need for judicial review.
The expansion of judicial review to affirmative preclearance decisions has
been suggested before,266 but it is an incomplete solution. Professor Nathaniel
Persily suggests its primary shortcomings stem from the volume of
submissions the Justice Department receives and the potential for abuse of the
appeals process;267 in other words, with both grants and denials of preclearance
subject to judicial review, appeals by aggrieved parties would become
automatic and flood the courts. To prevent this outcome, a corresponding
measure is required to minimize the number of appeals that would appear
before the courts.
To ensure further legitimacy in preclearance determinations, this Comment
suggests also requiring the Justice Department to issue formal and public
documentation detailing the bases for its decisions. For its limited
transparency, Professor Mark Posner likened the Justice Department’s
decision-making process to a “black box.”268 Despite the composition and
internal use of analytic memoranda, the Department does not currently disclose
the legal or factual findings informing its decisions.269 When denying
preclearance, the Department traditionally issues a letter that explains, in
general terms, the basis for its denial.270 When granting preclearance, it
provides less explanation still, typically issuing a form letter acknowledging its
approval of a proposed change.271
Currently, the DOJ already compiles data for proposed changes and drafts
internal-recommendation memoranda based on that data.272 With data
265 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989
DUKE L.J. 522, 525.
266 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 247, at 16–18; Tokaji, supra note 248, at 830–32.
267 See Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 246, at 215.
268 POSNER, supra note 247, at 9.
269 See id. at 9–10. Posner notes that these memoranda are considered confidential and are generally not
shared publicly. Id. at 10.
270 See id. at 9–10.
271 See id. at 10.
272 See, e.g., Memorandum from Tim Mellett et al., Dep’t of Justice, on Section 5 Recommendation to file
(Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/texasDOJmemo.pdf.
Justice Department staff composed a seventy-three-page memorandum detailing their opposition to the Texas
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compilation and analysis completed, the remaining steps to issuing formal
decisions are few. To conserve resources and facilitate easy access, the Justice
Department should publish those decisions on its website.273 Here, too, the
Department has already taken substantial steps toward simple publication of
formal decisions by maintaining a well-organized website with a section
devoted to preclearance requests; a page titled “Notices of Section 5 Activity”
categorizes requests chronologically by state, listing the jurisdiction affected
and the type of change proposed.274 By adding a hyperlink to each listing once
a preclearance determination has been made, the Justice Department could
publish decisions within its website’s existing organizational structure.
The Justice Department’s publishing of formal opinions and the availability
of judicial review would increase the transparency and, in all likelihood, the
legitimacy of preclearance determinations. Not only would the Department
lose public confidence by issuing indefensible opinions, but it would also lose
any advantage of partisan decision making if those decisions could be
overturned. A final benefit of the formal-decision requirement is that it would
provide courts with a better record for determining whether to hear an appeal.
If the Justice Department’s decisions adhere to the section 5 standard of
review—and they should, based on the Department’s desires to appear credible
and avoid reversal—then the court need not grant an appeal. In this sense, the
formal-decision requirement should stem the flow of appeals, and the
availability of appeals should ensure the legitimacy of the formal decisions.
Meanwhile, the preclearance process would become more resistant to partisan
influence and afford minorities a more active role in the defense of their rights.
B. Updating Section 5 Through Bailout
In addition to the partisan tensions tainting preclearance administration, the
changing nature of discrimination has rendered section 5, in its current form,
ineffective at reflecting modern sources of discrimination accurately. A
common criticism of section 5 is that its coverage is now both overinclusive

redistricting plan. See Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal, WASH . P OST , Dec. 2, 2005,
at A1. This memo was leaked to the Washington Post and is now available online. Id.
273 This is in line with the new trend toward e-rulemaking, in which government agencies are using the
Internet to document the rule-making process publicly and cheaply. See John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking:
Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 975 (2006).
274 Notices of Section 5 Activity Under Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/notices/noticepg.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
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and underinclusive.275 Currently, section 5 extends coverage to any jurisdiction
(1) that has used a “test or device” in the last ten years (including the use of
English-only ballots in jurisdictions with large language-minority populations)
and (2) where voter registration or participation in the 1972 presidential
election was below fifty percent of the population eligible to vote.276 In
NAMUDNO, the Court considered section 5’s “fail[ure] to account for current
political conditions” suggestive of its inability to remedy the evil it was
intended to address.277
Merely updating the coverage formula to reflect more recent elections has
been considered.278 As previously discussed, however, discrimination is not so
easily measured today: equality is no longer considered access to a vote alone
but access to a vote of relative substance.279 Thus, updating the coverage
formula to reflect more recent voter-registration rates or election turnouts
would still provide unsatisfactory coverage. In a 2007 article, Professor Persily
suggested a number of reasons for retaining the same coverage formula in the
2006 amendments, the most salient of which are the inherent difficulties in
crafting a new formula and the Supreme Court having already upheld the
current one.280 If updating the coverage formula is not a viable solution, then
section 5’s shortcomings with respect to coverage must be resolved through its
other provisions. This Comment suggests addressing the problem by
modifying the bailout process, which allows a covered jurisdiction to petition
the court for a determination that it no longer engages in disfranchising
practices and can be released from its preclearance obligations.
To bail out from section 5, a jurisdiction must obtain a declaratory
judgment from a three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of
Columbia.281 A jurisdiction seeking bailout has the burden of proving that it
(1) has not used a discriminatory test or device in the last ten years,282 (2) has
not been denied preclearance for any proposed voting change in the last ten

275

Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 246, at 208; accord NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512

(2009).
276

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(b)–(c) (2006).
129 S. Ct. at 2512.
278 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-554, at 3 (2006) (proposing an amendment to the Voting Rights Act of
1965 with an updated coverage formula, which was ultimately rejected).
279 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, supra note 56, sec. 5 (adding a provision protecting
minority voters’ ability to “elect their preferred candidates of choice”).
280 Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 246, at 211.
281 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a).
282 Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A).
277
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years,283 (3) has not violated any other provisions of the VRA in the last ten
years,284 and (4) has “engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation
and harassment” of voters.285 The bailout provision anticipates the Justice
Department’s involvement in bailout decisions and permits aggrieved parties to
intervene.286 However, this Comment proposes guaranteeing concerned
minority groups a fixed role in bailout proceedings by making representative
organizations parties to such proceedings for the jurisdictions in which they
reside.287
This level of involvement from interest groups would have a number of
benefits. Not only would this increased involvement serve as an additional
check on the Justice Department (whose recommendations are traditionally
afforded great deference by the courts),288 but it would also give covered states
every incentive to include minority groups in their decision-making processes.
If minorities have an assured voice in bailout proceedings, states should strive
to ensure that that voice weighs in favor of bailout. This measure would,
therefore, encourage covered jurisdictions to communicate more openly with
their minority residents prior to seeking bailout.289 Such a dialogue would
increase transparency in local legislating and offer minorities more
opportunities to voice their perspectives, with a higher likelihood of those
views being taken into consideration.290 Involvement of interest groups could
also assist jurisdictions seeking bailout with respect to the fourth requirement
by evidencing the jurisdiction’s “constructive efforts” toward achieving
equality in voting.291
Though it would be a substantial step toward improving section 5 through
the bailout provision, this adjustment alone would not facilitate the desired
level of change. The incentives for improvement offered by this proposal are
only present if a jurisdiction anticipates bailing out. Historically, the number of
283

Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(E).
Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(D).
285 Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(F)(ii).
286 See id. § 1973b(a)(9).
287 Professor Gerken notes that civil rights groups are well situated to handle this type of role because they
are consistently up-to-date on proposed voting changes and their potential consequences, and frequently called
upon to weigh in on preclearance decisions by the Justice Department. See Gerken, supra note 259, at 725–26.
288 See POSNER, supra note 247, at 6 (noting that the Justice Department enjoys a “high rate of
success . . . in declaratory judgment actions”).
289 See id. at 729 (suggesting that the threat of judicial review would support a negotiation model of
decision making between covered jurisdictions and minority groups).
290 See id.
291 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F)(ii).
284
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jurisdictions seeking bailout has been very low.292 To reap the benefits of the
modified bailout process suggested above, this Comment suggests mandating a
periodic bailout review of all covered jurisdictions. Professor Richard Hasen
and Congressman Lynn Westmoreland advocated for the inclusion of a
“proactive bailout measure” in the 2006 amendments to the VRA.293 Their
proposal, however, was intended to achieve different ends. Specifically, Hasen
and Westmoreland sought to make section 5 more defensible by offering an
easier opt-out clause.294 Enhancing section 5’s responsiveness to improved
conditions in covered jurisdictions would, indeed, be a benefit of periodic
review. Also beneficial would be addressing the Court’s concern in
NAMUDNO that section 5 “fails to account for current political conditions.”295
However, periodic review in the context of this Comment’s proposal could
further more immediate goals.
Preclearance demands a relatively low showing of fairness: the
retrogression standard requires only that a proposed change maintain the status
quo.296 Bailout, on the other hand, requires that a jurisdiction not only comply
with the VRA but also undertake affirmative steps to further equality.297 Some
argue that the heightened standard for bailout explains the provision’s
underuse.298 Bailout was, however, relatively common in the VRA’s early
years.299 Professor Persily notes that “several jurisdictions successfully bailed
out of the original VRA and the two subsequent reauthorizations, [but] only
fourteen counties (all in Virginia) have successfully bailed out since 1982, and
no others have attempted to do so.”300 If the problem were related to the
stringency of the bailout standard, one would expect a consistently low figure,
rather than a steady decline. This Comment suggests that the decline in
bailouts instead corresponds with the growing view that section 5 is outdated
and irrelevant.301 Section 5 may once have imposed a stigma on covered

292 Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 246, at 212 (noting that only fourteen counties have
successfully bailed out since 1982).
293 Id.; see also Rick Hasen, Hasen: Drafting a Proactive Bailout Measure for VRA Reauthorization,
ELECTION L. BLOG (May 18, 2006, 9:37 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/005655.html.
294 See Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 246, at 212.
295 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009).
296 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
297 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F) (2006).
298 See, e.g., Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 246, at 213.
299 See id. at 212.
300 Id.
301 See discussion supra Part I.C.
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jurisdictions, from which they desired to redeem themselves by bailing out.302
If section 5 is no longer perceived as legitimate, however, then it follows that
the incentive to meet the higher bailout standard has waned.
In addition to the renewed life this Comment attempts to breathe into
section 5 as a whole, the periodic-bailout proposal is intended to renew the
trend toward bailing out and encourage covered jurisdictions to actively further
equality in voting. A covered jurisdiction today could dismiss the stigma
associated with its covered status as being residual of the original VRA, rather
than a reflection of its current state. Periodic-bailout review would identify the
jurisdictions for which this is true and release them of their preclearance
obligations.303 In jurisdictions where this is not the case—where discrimination
still poses a problem—periodic review would draw attention to their failures to
progress. This would likely have the effect of reestablishing the stigma
associated with section 5, for there is a considerable difference between having
been identified as a suspect jurisdiction in 1965 and having been deemed
suspect anew in 2011. The presence of a jurisdiction’s minority organizations
at the bailout proceedings should only further its need to appear credible and
desirous of progress. Thus, the inclusion of minorities in the bailout process
and a periodic review of bailout eligibility would address issues of partisanship
and transparency, and would encourage efforts to combat the new sources of
discrimination.
C. Updating Section 5 Through Bail-In
The bailout modifications suggested above address the overinclusiveness of
section 5, but the problem of underinclusiveness remains. As modern
discrimination sheds its resemblance to the Jim Crow South,304 section 5 needs
to adapt in its ability to identify and remedy new sources of discrimination.
Following the 2000 and 2004 election controversies in Florida and Ohio, many
wondered how such flagrant abuses of the election process could spur national
legislation, like the Help America Vote Act, but avoid triggering section 5

302

This hypothesis is supported by the higher number of bailouts in the VRA’s early years. See Persily,
The Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 246, at 212–13.
303 It would also address other potential sources of low bailout rates, like the cost of hiring lawyers to
prepare the bailout request and the hesitation to apply for a bailout while facing an uncertain outcome. See id.
at 213.
304 See discussion supra Part II.B–D.
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coverage.305 If updating the coverage formula is not feasible,306 then the
solution must again lie in one of the VRA’s other provisions.
The VRA currently offers a “bail-in” provision that brings noncovered
jurisdictions under the preclearance umbrella, regardless of whether they meet
the coverage formula’s criteria.307 Referred to as the “pocket trigger,”308 this
provision permits a court to impose preclearance requirements on a jurisdiction
found to be in violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments “for such
period as it may deem appropriate.”309 Despite the great potential this
provision has to render the preclearance regime more responsive to modern
forms of discrimination, it is largely underused in practice and seldom the topic
of academic discussion.310
A likely explanation for the bail-in provision’s rare invocation is the
onerous burden of proof attributed to it by courts.311 Not only is the burden of
proof in section 2 cases on plaintiffs, but also the Supreme Court has held that
bailing-in a jurisdiction requires proof that a challenged action was undertaken
with discriminatory intent.312 Time and again, however, Congress has steered
the VRA toward an emphasis on discriminatory effects over discriminatory
purpose. In 1980, the Supreme Court held in City of Mobile v. Bolden that a
plaintiff must prove a voting law was adopted or administered with
discriminatory purpose to challenge it successfully under section 2.313
Congress’s 1982 amendments to the VRA reversed this standard in favor of
305 See, e.g., Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 246, at 208 (“[I]t is difficult to defend a
formula which, for example, covers counties in Michigan and New Hampshire, but does not cover the counties
in Ohio and Florida with the most notorious voting rights violations in recent elections.” (footnote omitted));
Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help America
Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1209 (2005) (detailing the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ finding
that “blacks were far more likely than non-blacks to have their ballots rejected” in the 2000 election (quoting
Allan J. Lichtman, Report on the Racial Impact of the Rejection of Ballots Cast in the 2000 Presidential
Election in the State of Florida, in U.S. C OMM’ N ON C IVIL R IGHTS , VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN F LORIDA
DURING THE 2000 P RESIDENTIAL E LECTION app. VII, at 4 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
306 See supra text accompanying notes 278–83.
307 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006).
308 Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic
Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 1997 (2010).
309 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).
310 See Crum, supra note 308, at 1997, 2010 (noting that, prior to his Note, the “obscure” pocket trigger
provision had “never received full-length treatment from any book, article, note, or comment”).
311 See id. at 2009.
312 See id.
313 See 446 U.S. 55, 62, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion), superseded in part by statute, Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b,
1973c, 1973aa-1a, 1973aa-6).
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one where a violation could be established instead with proof of discriminatory
effects.314 This tension resurfaced twenty years later with the Court’s decision
in Bossier, requiring a showing of retrogressive purpose to satisfy section 5’s
purpose prong.315 Congress again responded in the 2006 amendments to the
VRA by restoring the pre-Bossier standard of “any discriminatory purpose.”316
A review of the VRA’s legislative history thus reveals that the Court’s bailin standard is no longer consistent with the Act’s other provisions. This
Comment proposes substituting the purpose-based inquiry under bail-in
analysis with an effects-based inquiry to (1) keep this provision consistent with
Congress’s intentions for the VRA and (2) allow bail-in to become a more
integral part of the preclearance regime.317 The VRA’s coverage formula
represents a static standard that no longer accurately identifies the indicia of
disfranchisement.318 And as it stands, bail-in offers only a marginally better
solution: requiring proof of discriminatory intent ultimately condones the
enactment of laws that are known to disfranchise minorities (i.e., have
discriminatory effects) but whose discriminatory implications are not viewed
as problematic.319 On the other hand, the amended bail-in provision proposed
by this Comment would afford private citizens better opportunities to confront
jurisdictions that engage in patterns of discrimination and would influence
change within those jurisdictions. On a larger scale, it would offer section 5 a
more flexible standard better equipped to identify contemporary sources of
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Section 5 was originally embraced because of the crisis it was intended to
resolve. The widespread disfranchisement of black southerners was a concrete
issue the country could readily tackle. Today’s problems are more abstract:
America’s minorities are no longer exclusively black, and discrimination
314

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 sec. 2.
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 332 (2000).
316 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, supra note 56, sec. 5.
317 Congress’s rationale for changing the 1982 amendments applies in this context as well: (1) the
appropriate inquiry is whether minorities’ votes are being diluted, not why; (2) accusing legislators of racism is
“unnecessarily divisive”; and (3) proving discriminatory intent is too onerous a burden on plaintiffs. Richard
L. Engstrom, The Reincarnation of the Intent Standard: Federal Judges and At-Large Election Cases, 28
HOW. L.J. 495, 497–98 (1985) (emphasis omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36–37 (1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
318 See supra text accompanying notes 278–83.
319 Consider, for example, the Arizona and Georgia cases discussed in Part II.C–D.
315
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against them is not exclusively Southern. As this Comment has demonstrated,
however, the metamorphosis of discrimination does not signal its end. In
addition to the structural inequalities minorities have always faced, they are
increasingly the casualties of a tense political and economic environment, and
of a raging partisan power struggle. America’s minority population is growing,
and with its growth rises the percentage of the population whose access to
meaningful participation in the electoral process would be threatened by the
abolition of section 5—the VRA’s most important, and most endangered,
provision.
Scholarly and judicial skepticism of the continued need for section 5 are
based largely on an understanding of the provision as a product and solution
confined to the Jim Crow South. This interpretation is not only oblivious to the
modern sources and victims of disfranchisement but also directly in conflict
with Congress’s continued commitment to section 5. Congress has
demonstrated its intentions with respect to section 5 by renewing and
expanding the provision at each term, extending protection to “language
minorit[ies]”320 and ensuring that access to a vote encompasses access to a
meaningful vote.321 In these respects, section 5’s work is not done.
To some degree, section 5’s critics are correct; despite congressional
attempts to update the statute in light of demographic and political changes, the
statute still does not adequately reflect the problems it was intended to resolve.
Rather than abolish section 5, however, this Comment advocates reorienting
the VRA’s provisions to render section 5 more receptive to the needs of
minorities and more resistant to partisan influence. As signaled by NAMUDNO
and Perry, the resolution of this issue is imminent.322 The approach suggested
by this Comment would resolve both the practical and constitutional concerns

320 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 4, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a (2006)).
321 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, supra note 56, sec. 5 (prohibiting voting practices that
diminish any U.S. citizen’s right to “elect their preferred candidates of choice”).
322 See 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); see also supra notes 234–39 and accompanying text.
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surrounding section 5 and reinvigorate the country’s dedication to achieving
equality in voting.
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